Libertarianism in dilemma | Ojel L. Rodriguez Burgos

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The recent weeks have been very difficult for almost every individual across the world thanks to the outbreak of the Coronavirus. The adoption of lockdowns and state intervention measures, in order to deal with the crisis, are ones that have not been seen since the days of the Second World War. These measures have tested the philosophy and policies predominantly of parties or ideologies on the (nominal) right of politics. Big-government policies, and in particular their popularity, have put the most pressure on the ideology of Libertarianism.

It is, today, certainly on the back foot. As the government response continues to involve ever increasing levels of state action, libertarians face a major dilemma in the area of political theory.

Libertarianism is a loosely-coagulated set of beliefs that value above all else individual freedom, provided it is not used to harm another individual. This concern about individual freedom is seen in the very first sentence of “Anarchy, State and Utopia” by Robert Nozick. Arguably the most influential philosophical defence of libertarianism, to have been written in contemporary normative political theory. 

Nozick wrote: 

Individuals have rights and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).” These rights, following from the tradition of John Locke, are rights in particular pertaining to life, liberty and property.

​ These individual rights form the first building block of the libertarian approach; the other one is the concept of self-ownership. This concept, which is hardly mentioned in Nozick’s book itself but attributed to him by G.A. Cohen, proclaims that every individual is the owner of themselves and their internal resources (talents). Hence, everything produced with his labour, combined with the just acquisition of natural resources, the individual has ownership rights over.

These are foundational stones of libertarianism as a normative political theory, though largely influenced by the works made by prior classical liberal supporters philosophers such as John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. These concepts of protecting individual rights and self-ownership are intuitively attractive as G.A. Cohen admits in his book Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality. Yet, the level of state action being undertaken around the world at this moment begins to create a serious philosophical dilemma for this mode of thinking.

The problem being that libertarians can’t normatively articulate why the current actions of states across the world are morally permissible. 

When looking at their concepts of individual rights and self-ownership, it becomes plainly obvious that it’s impossible. Most measures being adopted by national governments around the world such as the Italian police assuming the power to arrest, fine and detain, have led to the concentration of power in the state and the erosion of individual freedom so cherished by libertarians. Borders have been closed, preventing the free movement of people and capital, alongside a massive redistribution of wealth to the people and economic sectors affected by the pandemic.

By depriving the public of opening their businesses and of going out and about in the country, these actions violate the individual’s rights and ownership of themselves and their talents. 

A possible fallback position for a libertarian to take is to argue that the Coronavirus is causing harm to individuals - breaking John Stuart Mill’s harm principle and breaching the foundation stones of Nozick’s theory, individual rights and self-ownership. However, how directly does an individual’s action harm another individual through transmission of a sentient virus? The answer to that question is certainly ambiguous; political libertarians have been struggling with finding a definitive one.

The harm instead of being individual, could be societal. But, adopting a principle of societal harm to argue from a libertarian perspective, could be used to normatively argue against the liberalization of drugs. A policy dear to the heart of many libertarians.

Libertarians, to my knowledge, have not yet responded to the clear philosophical problem the entire pandemic creates for their ideology. But to their credit, they have adopted a response to criticism being leveled on them. Most have provisionally accepted the actions taken by the state given the rarity and extreme circumstances we currently live in. But with the important caveat of sunset clauses to the statutes or limits in the use of these measures.

This approach, although not addressing the philosophical problem, seems sensible and one that us philosophical conservatives can find ourselves in some agreement with as this crisis rages on. That’s because we believe in the idea of ordered liberty, which is anchored in restraints on our desires, and on the government, under the cardinal value of prudence. The measures needed to fight threats to the common good — whether they be in violent crime, economic warfare, terrorism, rampant corporatism or global pandemics — are both tough and necessary for the safeguarding of our well-ordered society. Yet, at the same time, everybody must always be wary of giving excessive powers to the state. While recognising the legitimacy of government action in order to protect the collective and preserve the health of a well ordered society, conservatives should simultaneously argue vehemently that every action the state takes is guided by prudence.

Accepting this response, despite the clear contradiction with the elements of libertarianism that the current measures (universally adopted and lauded) cannot be supported by their theory, creates the predicament. The limitations of their ideology, in its unrestricted free-moving applications in politics, have been lain bare. For the duration of this crisis, and likely for a time after, they have been rendered utterly discredited.

Hence, they face only two choices. First, they alter the principles of libertarianism and adopt a more complex principle on the permissibility of state intervention - one that doesn’t discount the collective entirely or reduce the individual to an entirely isolated atom. Second, they outrightly reject the actions being taken by the state, that liberty being an important value must be preserved. This second option which intellectually sound libertarians have already adopted, will be the focus of the second part of the Libertarian dilemma.

For it is hard to see how our security could be ensured, right now, without a strong state.

Ojel L. Rodriguez Burgos

Ojel L. Rodriguez Burgos a Policy Fellow of The Pinsker Centre, a campus-based think tank which facilitates discussion on global affairs and free speech. He is a is graduate student from University College London and has undertaken a PhD at the University of St Andrews. The views in this article are the author’s own.

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