The “no-fault” divorce legislation is contrary to the nature of marriage | Sam George
It is at the best of times unsurprising that universally-applicable social institutions which have historically fostered community spirit, stability, and prosperity come under assault by successions of government otherwise bound to a creed of similar destructiveness toward organic social institutions: a natural poised tendency towards the ruthless eradication of that which formally exists outside of its direct control. It typically occurs under wide-reaching governments — most usually those of communistic endeavours — with an endless multiplicity of programmes designed to consume the role of community and social institutions. Marriage and the family are no exception.
Catholics have for some time been decrying this trend, suggesting its remedy through the principle of subsidiarity— the concept of dismantling State offices which are considered to unnecessarily fill positions typically held by families, communities, and otherwise organic social institutions. Marriage is one such institution, and has recently come under attack once again through the quiet approval of a “no-fault” divorce Bill.
Whether such a thing even exists is left open to question. The point is that there has been an evident disregard for its time-honoured principle and unification purpose, and is now left open to the assumption that one’s married life can be ended as a result of whimsical indecision— i.e., one can instigate divorce without the implication that their spouse has committed grave error. Yet below all this, there is much more to consider: the purpose of marriage, the purpose of divorce, and their contextual implications against both individual and community.
First, it is necessary to consider the very Biblical connotations of marriage and divorce, as these have set the precedent to common understanding throughout the centuries. Its earliest ordinance as a heavenly command is within Genesis 2:24, wherein man is to “leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife,” through which “they shall become one flesh.” In common parlance, this is what has been implicated through the purpose of marriage: perennial unity of two separate and distinctive people for the purpose of sustenance, multiplicity, and community.
Likewise, it is understood that the Christian case for divorce is, in any sense, inherently tied to the realisation that one’s spouse has committed a grave transgression against the dignity of their shared life. One prominent example of this— and the one given by Christ (Matthew 5:32)— is adultery. The condemnation of this act was carried over from its root in the formative Mosaic Law laid bare in the Ten Commandments—more specifically, the eighth and the tenth. (Exodus 20: 14, 17.)
Yet, one should ask: Why does this theological perspective have any consequence to the non-Christian conservative? Quite simply because it sets the precedent of a higher standard which produces not only the smallest contingent of a healthy, functioning and self-sustaining society, but also typically provides the best surety against individual shortcomings as well as ensuring successful inheritance. Such stability is best within the context of an arrangement which is not only incredibly localised and also deeply interpersonal, but voluntarily entered-into on the understanding that there are contingent duties and responsibilities of both parties of man and woman to each other, their homes and surrounding community.
If these responsibilities are breached — such as in cases of domestic abuse, adultery, and so forth— then divorce becomes a mechanism of punishment to ensure guilt and loss in appropriate circumstances. With this in mind, “no-fault” divorce weakens that mechanism by allowing deep-rooted ties to be frustrated by the whims of an indecisive misunderstanding of one’s commitments to an intimate partner. It could even become the result of minor errata—which otherwise can be successfully neutralised with appropriate reasoning, commitment, and understanding—leading to the externalisation of punishment on another based upon one’s immediate desire to breach said commitment.
Although it is not adequate nor legitimate to quantify every aspect of human relationship purely in terms of contract and tort law, it does in this case further retain some merit: in no other instance of contractual obligation—presuming that the parties are knowledgeable of conditions—is it deemed acceptable to bear flagrant disregard for the responsibilities incumbent upon the involved parties. This applies to most conditions, particularly where community and insurances are concerned; the same should apply to marriage. In this sense marriage is a contract as much as it is a voluntary, binding union. Of course, there may well be some instances wherein one or both parties are not fully knowledgeable of the conditions, though that does not have its cultural or religious origins in the European nor Christian practice.
Yet, can’t this find its blame in the cultural context which has altogether stripped away the appropriate levelling-ground of courting, dating, and taking time? In those circumstances, people are still entirely at liberty to leave in a case of diminishing returns. Much the same applies to those who take time to figure their aims, standards, and experiences. However, this is becoming steadily impossible in a culture which increasingly rewards immediate gratification, the offsetting of personal liability and expense, and—perhaps most fundamentally—the withering of social institutions which existed entirely independently of the government. Conservatism in its social sense looks to preserve the autonomous dignity of those natural institutions.
It should go without saying that this case is one which is explicitly conservative in its principle. The basis for asserting against the contrivance of a “no-fault” divorce is not only the desire to see what remains of the sanctity of marriage and family left intact, but also with an enduring suspicion behind the motives for its subtle passing-through at an otherwise deeply unstable time. It is no secret that the State of the modern paradigm has sought, time and again, to trample those institutions which have typically endured outside of its control.
A good example of this is the historic ability of churches to provide successful, private charity work to those genuinely in need. With that in mind, it could well be worth noting that there are a number of policy implications which could result from the effect of ‘no-fault divorce’, such as the further loosening of the very definitions of marriage, the enforcement of all institutions to accept those definitions — even against their will, in some cases — and potentially further shifts in the treatment towards children of separated households and the impact it could well have on the education system. But this is not about the nuances of a welfare system; rather, it is about marriage.
The point is that, by and large, the principle remains the same: weaken the basis of an independent institution, and one will inevitably guarantee a greater reliance upon the State itself, putting at threat the organicism of ordered liberty. If, for instance, there is a spike in divorce — what uncertainties faced by the newly-single individuals could be subsumed by the State? Immediate thoughts are: supplementary income, extension of childcare and the corollary State manufacturing of people, an enforced flooding of the labour market producing a corresponding depression of wage rates — &c.
The overall purpose is not to pontificate about the fine details of how an ideal marriage should look. Largely, this varies between individuals, communities, and their cultural basis. The point is to raise awareness to the fact that, for any such marriage and familial stability to exist in the first place, there should be deference to the time-honoured institution which has adapted to the means which best ensure it. Such deference implies reverence for its conditions as well as its rewards, as in many cases one does not exist without the other. Although the conditions have been elaborated to an extent above, the rewards are undeniable to the countless generations who have found happily fulfilled lives through the normative understanding of marriage: relentless commitment to the love and care of one’s spouse and children.
In fact, the successive transference of social institutions, the harmony of living spaces, the security to spend a childhood in innocence and learn throughout the years, the food on the table, the roof over the head—all serve as a testimony to the guarantee of marriage properly understood. Taking such a commitment to another seriously involves a presuppositional seriousness toward the very means by which these commitments are made truly secure.
