Ukraine and British Grand Strategy | Dominic Lawson

The UK’s European Strategy

The concept of grand strategy is as old as the study of geopolitics itself. In a sense, it is geopolitics in its purest form, being concerned solely with issues of material power and not with sentiment or petty domestic issues.

By grand strategy, we mean a long-term plan which takes account of geographic reality to allow a nation to maximise its power and prevent it falling prey to the ambitions of other states.

Because it places geography at its centre, a country’s grand strategy will be  multigenerational. State elites, in theory, will come to adopt the assumptions of their nation’s grand strategy almost as an instinct, slowly being inculcated by its logic as they rise to the heights of power.

At its core, the UK’s grand strategy is simply; ensure the division of Europe by any means possible. 

Why is this? 

The British Isles constitute a minor portion of the European continent. Our population and economy, while always in the upper leagues of the continent, would be dwarfed should Europe ever unify. Having such a stark power imbalance with an immediate neighbour is a situation any country would prefer never to manifest.

Even protected by the English Channel and the might of the Royal Navy, if a single power or alliance was able to control all of Europe, we would be placed in a delicate position where we could see our national interests disregarded. 

Even if this theoretical European power was not outwardly hostile to us, it would still mean we would be forced to entrust our security to a foreign actor, which is a fundamentally dangerous position to be in, considering that we cannot be sure how events will develop. 

Thus, London has always acted to divide the continent. This deep desire has driven our policy for centuries and has generally taken the form of British support for continental alliances to block the emergence of ambitious states. We have supported the opponents of, and  intervened against, Habsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, Imperial Russia and several incarnations of the German Reich.

Anyone who thinks that the recent relative peace of Europe means this strategy is outdated would be wrong. 

The reason that the UK was the most enthusiastic supporter of American occupation of Europe was because a Europe balanced between the Soviet and American empires suited British national security interests perfectly. 

After the collapse of Communism, the UK continued this strategy by joining the European community and attempting a form of internal sabotage to prevent integration and ensure the supremacy of NATO over any attempt at a European military framework. 

Now, the UK must readjust itself again. The US is leaving Europe to focus her resources on the Asia Pacific, NATO is fracturing and the European establishment, lead by Macron, are planning for “strategic autonomy” on the continent which is likely to entail a unified military structure and a more aggressive foreign policy. 

For the UK, this cannot be allowed to occur. 

I have written before that to preempt this, the UK should ally with Eastern Europe and encourage the creation of a new intermarium under Polish tutelage. Coined by the Polish master strategist Józef Piłsudski, the term denotes a theoretical alliance which would seek to compensate for Eastern Europe’s flat geography and peripheral position between two power centres by uniting to create strategic depth. 

This alliance is slowly resurfacing and the fast growth enjoyed by Poland’s economy, impressive military modernisation (including doubling the size of her armed forces) and the central position she has taken in opposition to the European centre suggest that Warsaw will lead it. 

Such an alliance would balance against the ambitions of our rival France and provide a grateful customer for Britain’s technology and defence sector, one of the fastest growing sectors of our economy. 

For conservatives, it could also offer a legitimate Rightist vision for the continent’s future development, compared  to the liberalism espoused by  the European centre, but that is more of a fortunate side effect than the intended aim of this policy. 

The Clash of Grand Strategies

By surface analysis, the UK’s interests in Ukraine are limited. It is a peripheral nation with very little importance to safeguarding our Home Islands or the sealanes that we depend upon for our fuel or other vital material. 

This is largely true as well for the United States, who are far more concerned with Taiwan, the First Island Chain and the broader Pacific theatre than they are with a country at the far border of Europe. 

However, Russia views the fate of Ukraine as an existential question for their national security and holds the escalatory advantage owing to proximity and willingness to commit resources to deny hostile alliances inroads into her periphery. 

This, ultimately, explains the reticence of Western states to further engage with the issue. The simmering frozen conflict that has played out in the country’s east since the Maidan revolution was a largely tolerable situation for both Russia and the Western bloc. 

Now, the situation on the ground has swayed in favour of Kyiv against the seperatist forces and Moscow likely believes that their opportunity to extract painful concessions from the Ukrainian government is coming to an end.

Asked several months ago whether Putin would order an invasion, I would have said no, but the scale of the forces arrayed on the Ukrainian border and the long list of demands publicly issued by Moscow, most of which NATO cannot accept, suggests that Putin has not found an offramp and may now believe that a short sharp attack against Ukraine to preferable to a slow degradation of Russian influence over the country. 

Telyrand once said that “you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them.” Now that the Russian military has gathered at such a cost and logistical effort, tension has boiled, and Putin can not de-escalate without achieving at least some of his strategic aims. 

Operation ORBITAL and the Ukrainian opportunity

Operational ORBITAL began following the start of the Ukrainian civil war. Initially a small operation aimed at capacity building, it has trained some 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers in first aid, logistics and other non lethal combat necessities. 

With the growth in tension, the operation has since grown to encompass the provision of lethal weapons with the stated aim of inflicting greater losses on Russian forces and changing the military balance in favour of Kyiv.

The lethal aid takes the form of 100 shoulder mounted light anti-armour weapons (NLAWs). An anti tank weapon designed to be fired by single soldiers, the NLAW was designed by a joint British and Swedish research project and is one of the first “tank busters' ' designed to be fully mobile. 

While an effective weapon in its own right, the provision of such a small number of them is unlikely to shift the military balance in any major way, instead the symbolism is extremely potent. 

Throughout this entire ordeal, the UK has been the Western European state most supportive of Ukrainian national interest. 

Compared to our continental rivals of France, which is attempting to marshal direct talks with Moscow, and Germany, who are dependent upon Russia's natural gas and fear that sanctions will adversely affect their own economy, and are even taking steps to block the transit of weaponry, the UK has aligned with Eastern Europe to buttress Ukraine’s military capabilities. 

And this is, ultimately, who this policy seems aimed at. There appears to be no plans in Whitehall to risk British blood and treasure for Ukraine itself. Instead, the UK is marketing itself to Eastern Europe as a steadfast and dependable ally, and in doing so helping to further divide Europe. 

The logic of this strategy, elucidated by Collingwood, aligns perfectly with British desire to prevent a common European military framework. There is a clear dividing line in European attitudes towards Russia, and therefore towards Ukraine, and we appear to be seizing the opportunity and splitting this cleavage in two. 

In many ways, the UK benefits from having this tension in Eastern Europe simmer as long as possible, as it is preferable that Europe remains disunited and Poland and other Visegrad Group become increasingly assertive in pursuing their strategic needs. 

Whatever action Putin takes, the UK actually has very limited options within Ukraine. Moscow has accrued an impressive warchest to protect against the likely sanctions regime, and Putin has shown he is willing to sacrifice short term economic growth for longer lasting geostrategic goals. 

But the UK has already benefited from the current standoff. We have already demonstrated our resolve to defend Eastern Europe’s frontiers. Should the situation escalate, we can shore up Polish and Baltic militaries with increased training or deployment of our servicemen.

We could even host a Ukrainian government in exile, this appears a relatively inexpensive policy and considering that British-Russia relations are already in a nadir, it is unlikely to make any material difference.

We should also evolve our policy to be less of a world power and embrace our position as the naval hegemon of Europe.

My personal view is that our military assets would be better used concentrated in our immediate neighbourhood rather than dispersed across the globe. It would perhaps make more sense, for instance, to have the Queen Elizabeth patrolling Europe’s southern and northern boundaries than to have it crossing between China and Taiwan. 

The recent Integrated Review indicated that British strategic planners do understand this, and the current crisis represents the perfect opportunity to do this. 

It may sound callous but geopolitics is an unsentimental artform, being as it is a guide to how to survive in a harsh world. It is often necessary to remind our leaders of that fact. 

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