How Britain could hold the key to the Caucasian impasse | Dan Mikhaylov
No matter whether, or how much, one agrees with Ronald Reagan's famously lugubrious characterisation of the USSR, the fact remains that its collapse was a bittersweet, mixed blessing. As much as it let millions unleash their potential within the international capitalist system and indeed enjoy greater freedom, it uncovered a multitude of ethnic power struggles, hitherto embellished with layers of centrally-appointed bureaucracy and nowadays inducing lamentable political instability.
The persistent brinkmanship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is precisely one such post-Soviet conflict. In the 1990s, the two waged a prolonged war, culminating in Nagorno-Karabakh’s secession from the latter. Furthermore, Armenia occupied 9% of its rival’s sovereign territory outside the aforementioned enclave. Since then, warfare has often determined political interactions in the South Caucasus, this decade alone recording seven especially violent clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.
Their most recent standoff, however, has attracted much greater attention worldwide than its predecessors. Two developments explain this.
Firstly, it was obvious that the post-pandemic era’s first military conflict would naturally heave into view, because the majority of Britons could not have possibly foreseen that polities would opt for so costly an enterprise as mobilising troops and sending them to the battlefront in these troublesome times. Fewer still could have imagined that these would be European, remembering how much Europe has suffered from conflict and how much it is now striving for pacifism.
Secondly, Turkish involvement on the Azerbaijani side, reportedly materialising in the relocation of pro-Turkish rebel fighters from Syria and Libya to the Caucasus, amongst other things, threatens to escalate tensions into something even more unnerving and disastrous than the current engagements.
Russia and France have been vocal on this issue, demanding an immediate ceasefire and encouraging the belligerent parties to return to peaceful negotiations under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group, created in 1992 to promote a lasting peace settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has remained comparatively quiescent.
In the eyes of some conservatives, London is no doubt immorally conniving at Azerbaijan invading and ransacking Armenian lands at a time when a truly conservative government would conversely be stalwartly standing up for human rights and seeking to protect Armenian Christians from their neighbours’ encroachments. To others, such taciturnity might be contestable on different grounds: despite the complications surrounding Brexit and the authorities’ unavailing struggle against COVID-19, Britain should take advantage of its international standing in the noble task of cajoling Armenia and Azerbaijan into ending their confrontation in the troubled Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although these criticisms are yet to emanate from a senior political figure within the Conservative Party, it is indefeasible that the nation’s conservative circles, otherwise supportive of Boris Johnson, are not universally content with the authorities’ stance on the matter.
However, this policy of neglect is not unreasonable. Given the competing priorities of soliciting an advantageous compromise with the European Union on the future of bilateral trade and reinvigorating the lockdown-crippled economy, the appeal of such an approach is even greater.
Nonintervention makes sense from the pragmatic viewpoint. Outrightly sabotaging commercial relations with Turkey by offering Armenia material assistance would be economically improvident, considering that more than 2,500 British companies operate in Turkey, and that London remains Ankara’s second-largest trade partner with a trade volume of almost £19 billion. Similarly, the unparalleled complexity of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, exemplified in the dissenting arguments for self-determination and territorial integrity, risks despoiling any potential assistance to Armenia of its ethicalness.
Azerbaijani forces did not invade Armenia proper, since it would trigger Russian intervention in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation provisions. Instead, it is engaging Armenian forces within what the international law sees as parts of Azerbaijan. In 1994, these were occupied by the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists or Armenians themselves, forcing c. 220,000 Azerbaijanis into exile from what would subsequently transform into the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh. Peculiarly, this entity remains unrecognised even by its allies in Yerevan, the Armenian capital. Although Baku is undeniably the recent skirmishes’ instigator, and the Republic of Artsakh does represent a territory that is 89% Armenian yet not within the confines of the official Armenian state, these factors are rightly deterring Britain from voluntarily getting bogged down in this region’s geopolitical quagmire.
That said, Britain would benefit from a slightly more coherent approach to the topic. This approach must arguably acknowledge not only what is diplomatically opportune, but also what is indisputably moral to align with the conservative mindset. Edmund Burke prized morality as the guarantor of liberty; discarding it entirely would place the government at ideological loggerheads with the Conservative Party’s very foundations. Herein, we outline a tripartite plan of action that Boris Johnson should follow to positively contribute to the wider reconciliation efforts.
Firstly, the United Kingdom must tackle what is unequivocally reprehensible: Erdogan’s input in the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict. Ankara has already been accused of shooting down an Armenian SU-25 fighter jet and sending proxies to fight along with the Azerbaijani soldiers, and its cooperation with Azerbaijan likely involves intelligence sharing and arms supply, too.
If Turkish intervention continues, it could embolden Azerbaijan to attack Armenia proper and increase both the scope and the geographical reach of regional bloodshed. It is similarly important to note that this represents yet another aggressive move by Erdogan. His standoff with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, his imperialist ambitions in Libya and Syria, and withal his hostility to the European Union are not only alarming per se, but also requiring action to influence Turkey’s heinous pursuit of its geopolitical agenda that comes at a cost to, and sticks in the craw of, the adjacent countries and regions. Therefore, Britain should join France and Russia in condemning and addressing Turkish interference in the Caucasus at the same time as prompting other Western countries to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on Ankara.
Secondly, as much as the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute is not clear-cut, the fact remains that further confrontation is dreadfully undesirable for the area itself and for the world at large. The latter’s revanchist offensive is hardly conducive to peace, and the UK should warn Azerbaijan to eschew launching attacks into Armenia proper and threaten it with sanctions, should Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, disregard British advice and blind the carnage to its neighbour’s immediate frontiers.
Such an offensive would render any remaining settlement proposals obsolete, and might incur the wrath of Russia, which has been reticent to assist Armenia on this occasion due to the Kremlin’s strained relations with the country’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The Islamic Republic of Iran, whose authorities Baku routinely accuses of backing Armenia, may equally be forced into action under such circumstances. With this in mind, diplomatic deterrence of additional Azerbaijani aggression seems just as important as reacting to Turkish military interference, when it comes to ensuring regional stability.
Thirdly, it is not in our interest to lead and coordinate the international peace effort in this context, but this should by no means preclude the Johnson government from supporting it and moulding its direction. This is particularly important now that the so-called Madrid Principles have been explicitly snubbed by the current Armenian administration, stripping the global community of a comprehensive and coherent solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.
Its provisions included returning the lands directly occupied by Armenia to Azerbaijan and bestowing Artsakh an interim status with guarantees of self-governance and direct demilitarised access to Armenia. In addition, the Madrid Principles incorporated a clause concerning the refugees’ right to return and the future self-determination of the Nagorno-Karabakh people.
Although this well-intentioned blueprint will not come into effect in its current form following Armenia’s backlash to it, Britain may prove instrumental in injecting some novel and valuable insights into it. After all, the UK was in a somewhat comparable position during the Troubles, when it had to deal with Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland and mitigate rife religious tensions. Since these were stoked as much by the agency of such paramilitary groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as by Britain’s own questionable decision-making, epitomised by the tragic events of Bloody Sunday, this was no easy feat. But the nation persevered and largely succeeded in subverting these problems.
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended the period of the Troubles, and its provisions may prove educative to those involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh military standoff. Besides disarming paramilitary groups, it paved the path for Northern Ireland gaining greater autonomy. Thus, the 2006 St Andrews Agreement restored the Northern Ireland Assembly, consistently upholding the agreement’s emphasis on cross-community consensus as a precondition for important political and legislative measures, which Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants would discuss and adopt in Stormont.
Most importantly, it settled the secessionist dispute once and for all. By affirming that the majority of those inhabiting Northern Ireland wished to remain within the United Kingdom, it solidified Britain’s claim in the eyes of those who had previously been challenging it. Simultaneously, it conceded that Irish nationalism is too widespread to qualify for a marginal sentiment, whence its authors entertained the possibility of a potential territorial transfer. However, to dissuade revolutionaries and instead foster a culture of mainstream political participation, it made territorial changes conditional on the goodwill of all three sides: Belfast, Dublin, and London.
Although the Good Friday Agreement is not without its shortcomings and omittances, it offers a positive experience, to which Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders may aspire. For this reason, London has the wherewithal to influence any future negotiations between them, and do so with considerable political authority.
The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is a complex geopolitical impasse, solving which necessitates strong willpower from Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as productive, rather than destabilising, inputs of the world’s powerful states. Understandably, the United Kingdom cannot cultivate the former, and must focus on persuading the belligerent countries to relent. On the latter aspect, its goal should involve countering Turkish interference by diplomatic means and rallying other states behind this as well as behind any positive attempts at conflict resolution. Britain itself may contribute to these peace-brokering initiatives, extrapolating the takeaways from the Good Friday Agreement to tackling this dispute. Thus, we shall strike the optimal balance between acting morally and pragmatically.
–
If you liked this article and want to help our organisation expand, please consider donating. Every little helps.
