Social liberalism, fiscal “conservatism” | Sam George

Since the Conservative Party’s successful election in 2010, the last decade has been steeped in a mire of promises surrounding the creation of a liberal society with a conservative budget. Not only did the catch-all become popular amongst younger Tory voters, but its legacy has stained the decade itself with years of wasted potential to affect real, genuine change. Against the promises to eliminate the deficit - it has grown; against the promises to balance the books - they have distanced further; against the promises to organise the budget - it is yet more chaotic. That is part of the reasoning behind a growing interest in social, as well as economic, conservatism.

So, what went wrong for the promissory pundits? A realisation of sorts is setting in: the two very distinctive requirements of both doctrines are in fact diametrically opposed and cannot facilitate one-another. The principle of conservatism must contain its root-and-branch approach, or it cannot call itself conservatism; otherwise, we end up with the half-baked, platitude-ridden “conservatism” of recent years. “Strong and stable,” anybody? 

Before anything else, this is not an intention against social liberalism as an ideological school; that is not the crux of this piece; instead, the purpose is to address the logical inconsistency of recent government policy, popular amongst Tory voters both young and older. 

The two terms - “social liberalism” and “fiscal conservatism” - taken to their logical extremes can be briefly but adequately defined as follows: the liberal society is one of overwhelming permissiveness, absolute acceptance, and the broadest expansion of positive rights as one could imagine. Eventually, all sorts of behaviours are made permissible. Alongside these principles is a regulated market economy, with the central government expected to stand in for issues considered “social.” To the contrary, a “fiscal conservatism” could be considered as the economic reverse: a redressal to balance revenue and expenditure, elimination of the deficit, cuts to taxation, a less excessive interventionist role in the market economy, and so forth.

These two ideological standpoints are so-called because of their relation to the principles which underscore them. Indeed, many of the mechanisms utilised to furnish the necessities of social liberalism are derived precisely from interventionary actions - particularly with targeted increases to taxation, regulatory premiums on business, and often outright legislating against x or y practice should it conflict with enforced positive rights. But how to adequately finance such decisions? 

A glance at history is enough to forewarn any statesman that heavy taxation is a quick way to find a revolution. Not only did England lose colonies in America over it, but has faced problems on her own soil related to it. A way to finance such projects demanded by a liberal society, whilst avoiding heavy taxation increases, has been recognised in the prevailing Keynesian consensus. A system best recognised as placing a complete trust in central government to fine-tune the economy, the most simplistic algorithms - “recession = underspending” and “inflation = overspending” - are employed at the service of a central banking network now hideously overgrown.

One can tell a Keynesian economist by their unrepentant reliance on statistical inference, forgetting that the latter by definition cannot guarantee results, but only imply them. Who today is unfamiliar with the financial pronouncements, plastered across the daily news, projecting “a economic adjustment” or “b recovery curve”? Yet, by these inferences, the hope of the public is writ large - and predictably dropped. Equipped with the administrative capacities familiar to fractional reserve banking, the fruits of such policy tend to be a devaluation of the currency induced by an artificially inundated credit market, and therefore oversupplied investment indicators, leading to mass liquidation and tax increase without much change in spending policy. Such a familiar boom-and-bust cycle not only occurs frequently, but intensifies on each turn - like a horse on its last legs, doped up to compete in the final race. What’s more, the initial promises to eliminate the deficit amount to none other than linguistic manipulation: what is implied is that the average annual increase of the deficit, rather than the deficit itself, is what will decrease! Printing, “fine-tuning,” and expenditure continue.

Indeed, one cannot maintain the perpetual extension of societal sub-groups, following their categorisation and inevitable fragmentation, whilst expecting a genuine programme that eliminates the deficit, stops artificial inflation, reduces tax, and enables businesses to operate functionally. Not even simple logic permits that a principle of extensive governmental intervention and legislative regulation is possible without a heavy tax burden, inflationary printing cycles, and a deficit. After all, war is understandably not an attractive alternative to fill out the Treasury’s coffers. Equally, an “anything goes” attitude necessarily creates the propensity toward high time-preference - i.e., immediate gratification - lifestyle decisions, and therefore, ultimately, facilitates the necessity of Keynesian central-banking policy. Without taxing to break the camel’s back, a deficiency in collated savings and investment must be made up somehow if the programme of social liberalism is to sustain itself. 

The remedy of social conservatism, making a truly fiscal-conservative programme viable, entails the identification, appraisal, and continuation of those attitudes, institutions, and traditions which have proven to create and continue a peaceful, stable society. In Britain, these institutions are typically derived from Christianity, and are therefore universal - they are anyone’s to replicate. It begins with the natural right in property and the married family, extending into the developmental stages of a market economy, the local parish, extended savings and investment, and common law frameworks - at a most basic analysis. All of these institutions acclimatise society to a stabilising tendency, bearing the fruits of a nascent social order; when they are dislocated by a centralising tendency to spend exorbitant amounts in ensuring a liberal society, each institution in turn faces rot.

Nevertheless, each particular tincture includes a host of variables and subtle developments, though at the root, the principle is the same. Only with such social authorities as the groundwork can one begin to construct a genuine fiscal-conservatism, as the former act as counterweights in the absence of a prescriptive government. Certainly, amongst the network of common law, primary deference should be given to those rights and institutions which form the root-and-vine of society itself; the rest become expedient therefrom. Any kind of legislative development is only efficient within the context of an agreed and fully-understood culture, eliminating the tendencies to arbitrary authority, which is instead the product of an extremely liberal and morally-relative society. The latter’s resulting low-trust society can only render “fiscal conservatism” empty phraseology. 

In sum, if one wishes to pursue a programme of genuine fiscal-conservatism - a balanced budget, eliminated deficit, low tax, high tendencies to personal saving and investment, and so forth - then one must first address the social situation at hand. An economic policy such as Keynesianism, coupled with an absolutely liberal social policy, with both enforced at the legislative capacity, has the tendency to offset the positive effects of traditional social authorities. The most basic principles of the latter have, in the tides of centuries, sustained human communities against undue incursions; eroding them is a fundamentally bad idea. First resort must be due to them, and secondary developments can be worked out in course. Economic conservatism must couple with social conservatism, and vice-versa.

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Sam George

Sam George is one of our columnists. He is a 22-year-old BA History graduate from the University of Southampton. He has gained certifications from City & Guilds in traditional blacksmithing/ironmongery and equestrian management with the aim of becoming a farrier. He enjoys reading philosophy, politics and religion.

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